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Three apparently contradictory stylized facts characterize the relationship between per capita 
incomes and life expectancy: (i) the existence of a strong correlation between the level of life 
expectancy and the level of per capita income, (ii) the absence of a significant  correlation 
between changes in per capita income and changes in life expectancy, and (iii) the persistence of 
twin peaks in the distribution of life expectancy, despite their progressive disappearance from the 
income data. This paper seeks to reconcile these apparently contradictory findings. We argue that 
a data generating process in which there is a relationship between income and life expectancy for 
high levels of development but not for low ones can explain these stylized facts, while models 
that apply a uniform relationship to all countries cannot. We also argue that the slope of the 
relationship between income and life  expectancy is significantly overestimated by standard 
cross-sectional estimates, with the  true slope being much lower for some countries and not 
statistically significantly different from zero for others. Lastly, we provide evidence from an 
error-correction model showing  that the elasticity of life expectancy to incomes has been 
declining both for countries at high and low levels of development. We suggest that these results 
can be interpreted as showing that income matters only for countries that are close enough to the 
world health technological frontier. 
 
Keywords: Life expectancy, income growth, Preston curve, health determinants, Monte Carlo 
experiments. 
 












The Human Development Research Paper (HDRP) Series is a medium for sharing recent 
research commissioned to inform the global Human Development Report, which is published 
annually, and further research in the field of human development. The HDRP Series is a quick-
disseminating, informal publication whose titles could subsequently be revised for publication as 
articles in professional journals or chapters in books. The authors include leading academics and 
practitioners from around the world, as well as UNDP researchers. The findings, interpretations 
and conclusions are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of 
UNDP or United Nations Member States. Moreover, the data may not be consistent with that 
presented in Human Development Reports. 1 Introduction
This paper seeks to improve our understanding of the relationship between per
capita income and health outcomes – in particular life expectancy - at the national
level. Understanding this relationship requires us to make sense of the patterns
present in the cross-country data. Regrettably, these appear to be contradictory.
On the one hand, we see a strong positive association between per capita income
and life expectancy in a cross-section of countries, suggesting a positive asso-
ciation between the two variables. On the other hand, we see the absence of a
relationship in diﬀerences even over relatively long time spans, suggesting the ab-
sence of a relationship. Third, we see the persistence of twin peaks in the world
distribution of life expectancy – even after high HIV countries are taken out of the
sample– suggestingthatdiﬀerentdatagenerating processesmay applytodiﬀerent
types of countries.
This paper argues that models in which the same empirical relationship is hy-
pothesized to apply to both poor and rich countries cannot make sense of the
evidence. In particular, we ﬁnd that both a model that presumes the existence of
a relationship between life expectancy and income across all countries and one
that presumes the absence of that relationship for all countries are deﬁcient in ex-
plaining the data. In contrast, we argue that a model in which the data generating
process applying to countries at low levels of development is diﬀerent from that
applying at high levels of development can make sense of all of these apparently
contradictory facts. We also show that standard cross-sectional estimates of the
1elasticity of life expectancy of income are systematically biased upward because
they ignore this dual data generating process. We suggest that these results can
be interpreted as showing that income matters only for countries that are close
enough to the world health technological frontier.
Theextentto whichdevelopmentpoliciesaimedat improvingpeople’shealth con-
ditions are centered on per capita income is, at least partially, based on empirical
evidence concerning the nature of the relationship between life expectancy and
per capita income. As public resources are even scarcer in developing than in
developed countries, it is imperative for policy makers to eﬃciently allocate the
available resources across public health and income growth promoting policies.
The academic literature to date has not yet reached a consensus on the extent to
which policies aimed at improving people’s health conditions should be centered
on economic growth. On the one hand, inspired by the impressive explanatory
power of the cross-sectional relationship of per capita income and health condi-
tion indicators such as life expectancy ﬁrst described by Preston (1975), it has
been argued that per capita income should be given considerable weight in devel-
opment policies. For example, Pritchett and Summers (1996), referring to empir-
ical evidence that per capita income growth signiﬁcantly reduces infant mortal-
ity, state that “raising per capita incomes will be an important component of any
country’s health strategy” (Pritchett and Summers, 1996, p. 844).1 Filmer and
1To do justice to Pritchett and Summers (1996), we should mention that they acknowledge
that, eventually, income growth may operate through “increased public and private spending on
goods that directly or indirectly improve health” (Pritchett and Summers, 1996, p. 844), and
that “investments speciﬁc to child health improvements are expected to be more cost eﬀective in
producing health gains than economic growth” (Pritchett and Summers, 1996, p. 865).
2Prichett (1999) ﬁnd that public health policies have only extremely small eﬀects
on health conditions; Filmer and Prichett (1999) also ﬁnd that per capita income
together with a dummy for a predominantly Muslim population, female educa-
tion, income inequality and ethno-linguistic fractionalization are able to explain
almost all the variation in infant mortality across countries2, stating that “[w]hile
there are poor countries with exceptionally good health status, properly account-
ing for income and other economic determinants leaves little to be explained by
independent variations in health policy” (Filmer and Prichett, 1999, p. 1310).
Pritchett and Viarengo (2010), reaﬃrm this point, and express concerns regarding
a developing country government’s ability to successfully implement health poli-
cies, even in those cases where policies at least in principle have a large potential
to improve people’s health conditions.
On the other hand, numerous authors question whether economic growth should
be assigned a prominent role in development policies aimed at improving peo-
ple’s health conditions. Cutler et al. (2006) argue that public health policies (via
the provision of sewage systems, removal of waste, clean water, information dis-
semination and health education) and increasingly the (international) diﬀusion of
healthknowledgehavebeen moreimportantfortheriseoflifeexpectancies across
developed countries since the end of the 19th century. Easterlin (1999) also makes
the case for the supremacy of public policy interventions over per capita income
2Their estimations, however, additionally include region dummies, several other dummies to
indicate missing observations on explanatory variables, the percentage of the population living in
urbanareas, thefractionofthelandin tropicalzones,andthe fractionofthe populationwith access
to safe water (the latter three turn out to be individuallystatistically insigniﬁcant). It is not obvious
to what extent the impressive explanatory power stems from the inclusion of these variables.
3for the improvement of health conditions during the last one and a half centuries.
Preston (1975) argues that 75 to 90% of the growth in life expectancy is unrelated
to a country’s growthin per capita income. Given theaccumulated knowledgeand
the broad range of eﬀective health technologies available in the developed coun-
tries, large gains in life expectancy in developing countries should be viable by
comparably inexpensive measures: vaccinations, safer sex, breastfeeding, vector
control, (maternal) health education, rehydration and antibiotical therapies, alter-
ations in contaminating behavior and internalized attitudes towards the sick, see
Cutler et al. (2006). Diﬀusion and local adoption, which - in an era of globaliza-
tion - should be feasible at rather low cost are key to this argument, see Deaton
(2004).
In this paper, we provide empirical evidence in favor of the hypothesis that by en-
dorsing development policies which facilitate the adoption of existinghealth tech-
nologies and knowledge, developing countries can expect to improve their peo-
ple’s health conditions to a much larger extent than by pursuing income growth-
centered policies. To do so, we investigate the relationship between life ex-
pectancy and per capita income for two diﬀerent country groups over the time
period from 1970 to 2010. We ﬁnd that the estimated income elasticity in the
standard Preston curve is sizeably overstateddue to the failure to control for coun-
tries’ distance to the health technology frontier, and that catching up to the health
technology frontier is much more important for expanding life expectancies in de-
veloping countries. To further back this result, we contrast the ability of diﬀerent
data generating processes (DGPs) for life expectancy to replicate the patterns we
4observe in the actual data. In particular, we initially focus on two polar DGPs:
One in which per capita income is the sole determinant of life expectancy (the
stable Preston curve), and another one in which the evolution of life expectancy is
entirely independent of per capita income (the breakdown of the Preston curve).
As none of these polar DGPs is able to replicate the patterns observed in the ac-
tual data, we investigate a third DGP representing our hypothesis that per capita
income is of no importance for the determination of life expectancy in countries
far away from the health technology frontier, but may be of some (even though
very small) importance for countries close to the health technology frontier. We
ﬁnd that this mixing DGP is able to replicate the patterns we observe in the data.
Furthermore, weinvestigatetheevolutionoftheincomeelasticityovertimewithin
thestandardPreston curveand withinan error-correction modelwithtime-varying
coeﬃcients. We ﬁnd that the income elasticity of life expectancy has decreased
over time even in countries close to the health technology frontier, and that there
are indications that it has recently become statistically insigniﬁcant.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a brief
summary of the evolution of life expectancy from the 18th century to the present
day, some empirical evidence on the relationship between life expectancy and per
capita income, and our core hypothesis that income eﬀects of life expectancy are
overstated due to the failure of controlling for countries’ distance to the health
technology frontier. In Section 3.1, we set up a simulation exercise that contrasts
the ability of diﬀerent DGPs, each representing a competing theory about the role
of income in determining life expectancy, to replicate the patterns present in the
5actual data. In Section 4, we allow for long lags in the relationship between life
expectancy and per capita income, and brieﬂy investigate the evolution of the
Preston curve over the last four decades. Finally, Section 4.2 concludes.
2 The Confounding Relationship Between Life Ex-
pectancy, per Capita Income and Technology
Health conditions all over the world have undergone substantial improvements
during the last two centuries. Progress, however, has been everything but uniform
across countries. The Western world happened to be at the vanguard, experi-
encing the conquest of infectious diseases in the 19th and beginning of the 20th
century, andsubsequentlyfrom the1960sonthecardiovascularrevolution. Devel-
oping countries have begun to trace the paths of developed countries in improving
health conditions only recently. Many of the developing countries have displayed
impressive track records since then, beneﬁtting from already existing health tech-
nologies in the developed world, see Arriaga and Davis (1969) and Soares (2007).
The heterogeneity in the progress of health conditions across countries and the
nature of the progress itself are key to our argument in this paper. We therefore
brieﬂy outline the paths health conditions have taken over the last two centuries,
before we present our key arguments.
In 1840 England, life expectancy at birth was about 40 years, but has reached 77
years by now, see Cutler et al. (2006). In the 19th century, undernourishment
6and ignorance concerning the modes of transmission as well as the causal agents
rendered individuals particularly susceptible for infectious diseases, see Cutler
et al. (2006) and Easterlin (1999). As a result, people’s health conditions were
determined to a large extent by the prevalence of infectious diseases such as tuber-
culosis, malaria, cholera and typhus. It seems that at that time higher disposable
incomes enabled individuals to better meet basic needs, such as purchasing more
and better food, appropriate clothing and shelter.3 Thus, a positive relationship
between the level of per capita income and health conditions should be expected
to have prevailed at the time. However, it appears that the elasticity of health con-
ditions with respect to income must have been rather small. For example, neither
did life expectancy of English aristocrats exceed that of the rest of the population,
despite presumably better nutrition, nor was mortality lower in well-fed popu-
lations of the same period, such as in the United States (Livi-Bacci, 1991 and
Harris, 2004). Without knowledge of the mechanisms behind the most important
pre-mature death causes at the time, money could not eﬀectively buy protection,
let alone cure, and did most likely have only a limited positive impact on health
conditions.
From the 1850s on, modes of transmission of major communicable diseases re-
sponsible for large proportions of mortality (either directly or indirectly) were
discovered, and preventive action as well as improved sanitation enabled people
to counter adverse health outcomes, especially in urban areas.4 From the 1880s
3In fact, numerousauthors claim that improvednutrition was the main determinant of the large
health improvements achieved until the beginning of the 20th century, see Fogel (1997).
4See Soares (2007) for an extensive discussion of alternative explanations stressing diﬀerent
7onwards, in addition to the modes of transmission, the causal agents of many
communicable diseases were identiﬁed (the germ theory of disease), and health
outcomes could be further improved. As a result, the epidemiological transition
raised life expectancies at unprecedented paces: The expansion of the health tech-
nology frontier shifted the relationship between health conditions and per capita
income upwards.
However, the epidemiological transition at that time mostly passed by today’s
developing countries. While high prices might have played a role in preventing
today’s developing countries from adopting new health technologies back then,
other factors appear to have been at least as relevant, and presumably are even
more so today as the prices of eﬀective health technologies have fallen consid-
erably. For example, incentives of local policymakers to improve health condi-
tions by introducing eﬀective health technologies might have been undermined
by the limited local accountability of colonial governments and their disinterest
in the indigenous people, see Acemoglu et al. (2001). Even nowadays, the lack
of accountability of governments and administrations may constitute serious ob-
stacles to health technology adoption. For example, Lake and Baum (2001) and
Kudamatsu (2006) show that transition to democracy signiﬁcantly reduces infant
mortality; more generally, Franco et al. (2004) ﬁnd a positive correlation between
democracy, political rights and civil liberties on the one hand, and life expectancy,
infant and maternal mortality on the other hand. Low levels of education might
determinants of health improvements, and an analysis of the cross-sectional and inter-temporal
evolution of death causes as well as age mortality proﬁles.
8have also hindered the local adoption of technologies and knowledge (Nelson and
Phelps, 1966, and Benhabib and Spiegel, 2005). For example, Hobcraft (1993)
shows that the eﬀect of maternal education on health outcomes inter alia operates
throughgreatercleanlinessandincreasedutilizationofhealthservices. DeWalque
(2007, 2009) ﬁnds that educated individualsare more responsiveto HIV/AIDS in-
formation campaigns and more readily adopt protective behaviors. A deﬁcient in-
stitutional environment with bad governance might have been and continue to be
another factor underlying the failure of developing countries to adopt technolo-
gies from the developed world (Keefer and Knack, 1997). For example, Gauri
and Khaleghian (2002) ﬁnd that the quality of a country’s institutions is strongly
related to immunization rate coverage and vaccine adoption.
Paralleling the evolution of health conditions, per capita incomes started to grow
strongly in much of the Western world from the middle of the 19th century, but
not in today’s developing countries, see Pritchett (1997) and Bourguignon and
Morrisson (2002). The divergence of economic and health conditions across the
developed and the developing world formed the basis of the strong and, as we
will argue, misrepresented as well as misinterpreted correlation between life ex-
pectancy and per capita income in the Preston curve. Figure 1 displays the cross-
sectional relationship between life expectancy and per capita income in t = 1970
and t = 2010 for 136 countries.5 The solid lines in the upper panels depict ﬁtted
5See Appendix A.1 for a list of the countries included. Our results are based on a data set
compiled by the Human DevelopmentReport Oﬃce in the United Nations DevelopmentProgram.
In order to ensure that our results are not contaminated by the eﬀects of the HIV/AIDS epidemic,
we drop all countries with an HIV prevalence rate greater than 5% in 2007 according to the World
Bank’s WorldDevelopmentIndicators. ThehighHIV prevalencecountriesare: Botswana, Central
9values from the regression
llifeit = at+bt·lgdpit+uit, (1)
where llifeit represents the logarithm of life expectancy, lgdpit the logarithm of
per capita income, and i = 1,2,...,N indexes countries. In the bottom panels, the
Preston curve relationship is plotted in terms of the levels of life expectancy and
per capita income based on the estimates from Equation (1). The legends provide
the slope estimates, the associated p-values in parentheses and the R2’s.
African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique,Namibia, South Africa, Swazi-
land, Zambia and Zimbabwe. We also exclude major oil exporters as they are obvious outliers in
the relationship between life expectancy and per capita income: Guinea-Bissau, Brunei, Bahrain,
Kuwait, Libya, Quatar, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
10Figure 1: The Relationship Between per Capita Income and Life Expectancy







































































































































































Full Sample, 0.148 (0.00), R
2=0.60













































































































































































Full Sample, 0.095 (0.00), R
2=0.68








































































































































































Full Sample, 0.148 (0.00), R
2=0.60











































































































































































Full Sample, 0.095 (0.00), R
2=0.68
The main hypothesis in this paper is that the magnitude of the slope in the Preston
curve is actually spurious, in the sense that it is highly overstated, as it does not
only stem from life expectancy rising with increases in per capita income, but also
from the fact that many developing countries considerably lag behind the health
technology frontier, see Deaton (2007) for a similar point. Put diﬀerently, the
Preston curve does not control for a country’s distance to the health technology
frontier, a case of omitted variables bias.
The hypothesis that the correlation between life expectancy and per capita in-
come in the Preston curve mostly stems from the failure to account for countries’
11distance to the health technology frontier has three sets of implications. First,
when splitting the countries into those closer to the health technology frontier and
those farther away, two distinct Preston curves should be obtained, with the Pre-
ston curve of the countries closer to the health technology frontier located above
that of countries farther away. Moreover, the Preston curve of countries farther
away from the health technology frontier should be estimated quite imprecisely
due to the large degree of cross-country heterogeneity regarding the distance to
the health technology frontier, and should feature only a rather low explanatory
power. We choose the Human Development Index (HDI) as a proxy for the dis-
tance to the frontier of health technology for several reasons. First, the HDI is
constructed using literacy and enrollment rates and thus partly reﬂects a country’s
endowment with human capital that appears to be one precondition for the local
adoption of health technologies. Second, the HDI includes per capita income,
which is highly correlated with total factor productivity across countries, see Hall
and Jones (1999), and which should be closely related to the extent of health tech-
nology adoption. Finally, although somewhat circular, it includes life expectancy,
and thus directly proxies whether a country is likely to be in the group of coun-
tries close to or far away from the health technology frontier. Figure 2 revisits the
Preston curves estimated in Equation (1) and displayed in Figure 1, but adds to the
ﬁtted values for the full sample thosefor low-and high-HDI countries.6 The dash-
dot line represents results for high-HDI countries and the dashed line for low-HDI
6The HDI threshold is 0.5. See Appendix A.1 for a listing of the low (Nl = 37) and high
(Nh = 99) HDI countries.
12countries. In each panel, the countries with the dark (black in the electronic ver-
sion of this paper) labels are high-HDI countries, and the remaining ones are the
low-HDI countries. Table 1 displays the coeﬃcient estimates of Equation (1) for
the full sample and the two sub-samples together with their p-values and the R2’s.
Figure 2: The Relationship Between per Capita Income and Life Expectancy for
High- and Low-HDI Countries




































































































































































Full Sample, 0.148 (0.00), R
2=0.60
High−HDI, 0.091 (0.00), R
2=0.49
Low−HDI, 0.052 (0.14), R
2=0.06









































































































































































Full Sample, 0.095 (0.00), R
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High−HDI, 0.055 (0.00), R
2=0.61
Low−HDI, 0.040 (0.21), R
2=0.04
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Full Sample, 0.095 (0.00), R
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High−HDI, 0.055 (0.00), R
2=0.61
Low−HDI, 0.040 (0.21), R
2=0.04
13Table 1: Estimation Results for the Preston Curve






























Note: The table displays the results from regressions of Equation (1), that is
llifeit = at +bt ·lgdpit +uit,
for t = 1970,2010.
There are two distinct Preston curves for low- and high-HDI countries, and the
Preston curve for the low-HDI countries is imprecisely estimated with almost nil
explanatory power.7 The slope of the full sample Preston curve is substantially
higher than those of the low- and high-HDI countries. This conﬁrms the ﬁrst set
of implications of our hypothesis. The diﬀerence in the intercepts could be inter-
preted as the distance to the health technology frontier. Inspecting diﬀerences in
pre-maturemortalitycauses inlow-and high-incomecountriesin Table4 supports
this view: A substantial number of pre-mature deaths in low-income countries
(respiratory infections such as pneumonia, perinatal deaths, diarrheal diseases, tu-
berculosis, malaria, DPT, measles and polio, and to some extent even HIV/AIDS)
could be avoided by adopting existing health technologies and knowledge.
Second, aregressionofchanges inlifeexpectancyonchangesinpercapitaincome
should not produce positiveand statistically signiﬁcant slope estimates, especially
7The null of a single versus the alternative of two distinct Preston curves is rejected in formal
Wald tests.
14for the countries far away from the health technology frontier, as the improve-
ments in life expectancy that can be achieved by the adoption of existing health
technologies are much larger than the improvements that can be achieved by -
if there are any - per capita income growth, and as countries’ extent of adoption
is generally heterogeneous. Moreover, for countries close to the health technol-
ogy frontier, even if the heterogeneity in adoption should be expected to be much
smaller, statistically insigniﬁcant results should be obtained if per capita income
growth plays only a minor role for the determination of life expectancy relative to
theexpansionof thefrontier. In ﬁrst diﬀerences between 1970 and 2010, Equation
(1) can be re-written as
∆llifei,2010 = α+β·∆lgdpi,2010+ei,2010, (2)
where∆xi,2010 = xi,2010−xi,1970, α=∆a2010, β=b2010, andei,2010 =∆b2010·lgdpi,1970+
∆ui,2010. The solid line in Figure 3 displays the relationship between the changes
in the logarithms of life expectancy and per capita income as depicted in Equa-
tion (2) over the time period from 1970 to 2010 for the full sample and for high-
as well as low-HDI countries separately, and Table 2 displays the corresponding
coeﬃcient estimates together with their p-values and the R2’s.
15Figure 3: The Relationship Between the Changes in the Logarithms of per Capita
Income and Life Expectancy








































































































































































Full Sample, −0.022 (0.15), R
2=0.02
High−HDI, 0.022 (0.29), R
2=0.01
Low−HDI, 0.024 (0.40), R
2=0.02
Table 2: Estimation Results for the Regression of the Changes in the Logarithms
of Life Expectancy and per Capita Income
















Note: The table displays the results from regressions of Equation (2), that is
∆llifei,2010 = α+β·∆lgdpi,2010+eit.
The correlation in changes is statistically insigniﬁcant for all samples, but closer
to signiﬁcance for the high-HDI than for the low-HDI sample, which conﬁrms the
16second set of implications of our hypothesis. Similar result are found by Preston
(1980), Easterly (1999), Deaton (2007) and Kenny (forthcoming).8
Yet a third implication of our hypothesis is that as developing countries manage
to adopt technologies from the developed countries and move closer to the health
technology frontier experiencing large gains in life expectancy, the Preston curve
for the full sample should ﬂatten. The results in Figure 1 for 1970 and 2010
conﬁrm this implication. We provide more extensive evidence on this count in
Section 4.
To provide more rigorous evidence for our hypothesis that the Preston curve is
spuriously steep as it fails to control for the distance to the health technology
frontier, in the next section we present the results to several simulation exercises.
3 The Relationship Between Life Expectancy and
Income: Evidence from Simulations
InthissectionweaimtoassessthelikelihoodofdiﬀerentDGPsforlifeexpectancy
to generate the patterns observed in the actual data (the signiﬁcant correlation in
levels, the missing correlation in the changes regression, the R2, etc.). To this end,
we simulate life expectancy according to diﬀerent DGPs and estimate key statis-
8Notice, however, that Pritchett and Summers (1996) do ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant, positive
correlation for infant mortality. Also, Deaton (2004) obtains a statistically signiﬁcant, positive
correlation when weighting country observations by population; in this case, China features a
large leverage on the correlation.
17tics on the simulated data. Finally, we compare the distributions of the statistics
estimated on the simulated data from each DGP to the statistics estimated on the
actual data. We take the likelihoodof the statisticsestimated on the simulated data
from a speciﬁc DGP concording with the statistics estimated on the actual data to
represent the likelihood that the speciﬁc DGP is the true DGP of life expectancy.
A stylized fact that is going to be importantin thefollowingis that, as documented
by Canning (2010), the cross-sectional distribution of life expectancy is charac-
terized by twin peaks, whereas that for per capita income features only a single
peak. The left-hand side panel of Figure 4 displays the cross-sectional distribution
of life expectancy for both 1970 and 2010.










There are two peaks in the cross-sectional distribution of life expectancy in 2010,
one at about 52 and another at about 74 years. This twin-peak characterization of
the cross-sectional distribution of life expectancy has, in fact, strengthened over
18time. The twin peaks are a manifestation of a speciﬁc group of countries continu-
ously facing diﬃculties in adopting available health technologies, and thus being
stuck in an equilibrium with lower life expectancy. In contrast to life expectancy,
the twin peaks in the cross-sectional distributionof per capita income documented
by Quah (1996) appear to be signiﬁcantly weaker for 2010, see the right-hand side
panel of Figure 4.9
3.1 The Simulation Setup
We distinguish between three competing DGPs:
1. a stable Preston curve (“Preston curve DGP”),
2. independent dynamics for all countries (“independent shocks DGP”),
3. independent dynamics for low-HDI countries and a Preston curve relation-
ship for high-HDI countries (“Preston curve/independent shocks mixing
DGP”).
Essentially, while per capita income is the sole determinant of life expectancy
in the Preston curve DGP, it is of no importance whatsoever in the independent
shocks DGP. The Preston curve/independent shocks mixing DGP represents our
hypothesisof two diﬀerent sets of countries with a well identiﬁed Preston only for
the countries close to the health technology frontier in a stylized form.
9The twin peaks in the cross-sectional distribution of life expectancy remain when controlling
for the lower level of average life expectancy in Sub-Saharan African countries, see Figure 18 in
the Appendix.
19The same simulated per capita income series is used for all DGPs. We describe
the DGP of per capita income in Section 3.1.1, the Preston curve DGP in Section
3.1.2,theindependentshocksDGPinSection3.1.3,andthePrestoncurve/independent
shocks mixing DGP in Section 3.1.4.
3.1.1 The Data Generating Process for per Capita Income
Figure 5 shows a scatter plot of the growth in per capita income against the log of
per capita income in 1970.
Figure 5: Initial Log per Capita Income and Subsequent Income Growth






























































































































There does not appear to be unconditionalβ-convergence in per capita income. To
simulate per capita income data and to replicate its actual cross-sectional distribu-
tion reasonably well, we partition the set of actual growth rates in quantiles, and
obtain random growth rates by re-sampling for each quantile separately. Using
the random growth rates and actual per capita income values in 1970, we obtain




t=2010;i=1,2,...,N. Figure 6 compares the
actual cross-sectional distribution of per capita income in 2010 with the average
of the cross-sectional distributions of simulated per capita income across all repli-
cations of our experiment.
Figure 6: Cross-Sectional Distribution of per Capita Income in 2010







Logarithm of GDP Per Capita in 2010
Simulated
Actual
The cross-sectional distribution of simulated per capita income appears to be rea-
sonably close to the actual cross-sectional distribution.
3.1.2 The Preston Curve Data Generating Process
To obtain simulated life expectancy data based on the Preston curve DGP, we use













parametersb a2010,b b2010 ofthePreston curveand arandomshocke ui2010 =ρ·b ui1970+




i,2010 =b a2010+b b2010· g lgdpi,2010+e ui,2010. (3)
3.1.3 The Independent Shocks Data Generating Process
In contrast to the Preston curve DGP, under the independent shocks DGP the evo-
lution of life expectancy is entirely independent from that of income. Figure 7
shows a scatter plot of the growth of life expectancy over the time period from
1970 to 2010 against the logarithm of life expectancy in 1970.
Figure 7: Initial Life Expectancy and Subsequent Life Expectancy Growth






































































































































































There appear to be two regimes of life expectancy convergence countries can fall
into, one in which countries converge to high levels of life expectancy and an-
22other one in which countries converge to low levels of life expectancy. Figure 8
shows ﬁtted values from regressions of the growth in life expectancy over the time
period from 1970 to 2010 on a second-order polynomial in the logarithm of life
expectancy in 1970 together with conﬁdence bands, estimated separately for high
and low-HDI countries.10
Figure 8: Fitted Values for Initial Life Expectancy and Subsequent Life Ex-
pectancy Growth
We use the ﬁtted values and the conﬁdence bands of the convergence regressions
to draw random growth rates of life expectancy for the low- and high-HDI coun-
tries. Using these growth rates together with life expectancy levels in 1970, we








10The results are robust to using ﬁrst-order polynomials.
233.1.4 The Preston Curve/Independent Shocks Mixing Data Generating Pro-
cess
Under the Preston curve/independent shocks mixing DGP we split our sample
into low- and high-HDI countries. For the high-HDI countries, we simulate life
expectancy data for 2010 using the Preston curve DGP described in Section 3.1.2,
but using the Preston curve parameter estimates based on the high-HDI sample
only, see Figure 1 and the third row of Table 1. For the low-HDI countries, we
generate simulated life expectancy data independently from per capita income
according to the independent shocks DGP. Combining the Preston curve DGP
simulated life expectancy data with the independent shocks life expectancy data

























using the simulated data
24j ∈
￿
Preston, Independent Shocks, Preston/Independent Shocks Mixing
￿
, (4)
and store b γ(j,r), b d(j,r), the associated t-values and the R2’s. The distributions of
the statistics estimated on the simulated data are displayed in Figure 9. The solid
lines depict the distribution of the statistics estimated on the data from the Preston
curve DGP, the dashed lines the distribution of the statistics estimated on the data
from the independent shocks DGP, and the circled lines the distribution of the
statistics estimated on the data from the Preston curve/independent shocks mixing
DGP. The vertical lines represent the value of the corresponding statistic obtained
from the actual data. The legends provide p-values for one-sided tests of the
null hypothesis H0 : Bmedian > Z, where Bmedian is the median of the simulated
distribution of the statistic in question, and Z is the statistic estimated from the
actual data.
25Figure 9: Monte Carlo Results










Log Changes Regression: Point Estimates
Preston DGP, p−Value:0.007
Independent Shocks DGP, p−Value:0.799
Preston/IndepShocks Mixing DGP, p−Value:0.333









Log Changes Regression: t−Values
Preston DGP, p−Value:0.004
Independent Shocks DGP, p−Value:0.755
Preston/IndepShocks Mixing DGP, p−Value:0.251











Preston Curve: Point Estimates
Preston DGP, p−Value:0.064
Independent Shocks DGP, p−Value:0.977
Preston/IndepShocks Mixing DGP, p−Value:0.705











Independent Shocks DGP, p−Value:1
Preston/IndepShocks Mixing DGP, p−Value:0.77
Theﬁrst fourcolumnsinTable5providethe p-valuesandcriticalvalues(inbrack-
ets below) for two-sided tests of the hypothesis H0 : Bmedian = Z for the statistics
displayed in Figure 9.
While the independent shocks DGP is likely to generate results for the regression
of changes in the logarithm of life expectancy on changes in the logarithm of per
capita income in Equation (2) that are similar to those obtained from the actual
data, it fails to replicate the results for the Preston curve regression in Equation
(1). The Preston curve DGP, in turn, is unlikely to replicate especially the results
26for the changes regression in Equation (2), and also less likely to replicate the
results from the Preston curve regression in Equation (1) than the other DGPs.
Finally, the Preston curve/independent shocks mixing DGP is likely to replicate
all the results found in the actual data.
Figure 10 displays the averages of the simulated cross-sectional distributions of
life expectancy for each of the DGPs we consider together with the actual cross-
sectional distribution of life expectancy in 2010.
Figure 10: Cross-Sectional Distribution of Life Expectancy in 2010































shocks mixing DGP are able to replicate the twin peaks in the cross-sectional dis-
tribution of life expectancy in 2010 reasonably well, but that the Preston curve
27DGP fails to do so. The second to the last column in Table 5 reports p-values
of Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for the null hypothesis that the cross-sectional dis-
tribution of simulated life expectancy coincides with the actual cross-sectional
distribution of life expectancy. While the null hypothesis that the actual cross-
sectional distribution of life expectancy in 2010 is the same as that obtained from
the independent shocks DGP and the Preston curve/independent shocks mixing
DGPs cannot be rejected, the test rejects the equality of distributions for the Pre-
ston curve DGP.
To summarize the results, it appears rather unlikely that the patterns observed
in the actual data are generated by an underlying DGP as represented either by
a single, stable Preston curve relationship valid for all countries or completely
independent shocks to life expectancy and per capita income. The simulations
indicate that the patterns found in the actual data are much more likely to be
generated by a mixture of the Preston curve and the independent shocks DGP.
3.3 Robustness: The Double Preston Curve DGP
In this Section, we look at a double Preston curve DGP that interpretes our hy-
pothesis of two diﬀerent sets of countries with a well identiﬁed Preston only for
the countries close to the health technology frontier in the form of two distinct
Preston curves. Notice that in terms of policy recommendations, the double Pre-
ston curve DGP and the Preston curve/independent shocks mixing DGP are very
similar, as both imply that in order to improve life expectancy countries far away
28from the health technology frontier should aim to foster health technology adop-
tion rather than spur income growth. For the double Preston curve DGP we use
the estimates of the Preston curve parameters for the low- and the high-HDI coun-
tries in Table 1, and for the low- and the high-HDI countries construct simulated
life expectancy data as in the Preston curve DGP in Section 3.1.2. The results are
depicted in Figures 11 and 12, as well as in Table 6.
Figure 11: Monte Carlo Results for the Double Preston Curve DGP









Log Changes Regression: Point Estimates
Preston/IndepShocks Mixing DGP, p−Value:0.333
Double Preston DGP, p−Value:0.123









Log Changes Regression: t−Values
Preston/IndepShocks Mixing DGP, p−Value:0.251
Double Preston DGP, p−Value:0.091











Preston Curve: Point Estimates
Preston/IndepShocks Mixing DGP, p−Value:0.705
Double Preston DGP, p−Value:0.574










Preston/IndepShocks Mixing DGP, p−Value:0.77
Double Preston DGP, p−Value:0.449
29Figure12: Cross-Sectional DistributionofLifeExpectancyin2010fortheDouble
Preston Curve DGP


















The results for the double Preston curve DGP are very similar to those from the
Preston curve/independent shocks mixing DGP. This is probably because the Pre-
ston curve is statistically insigniﬁcant for the low HD countries in the actual data.
4 The Breakdown of the Preston Curve
We have argued so far that the correlation of life expectancy and per capita in-
come in the standard Preston curve is overstated because of the failure to con-
trol for developing relative to developed countries’ systematically farther distance
from the health technology frontier. In this section, we provide evidence that
the elasticity of life expectancy with respect to per capita income for countries
close to the frontier has declined over the last couple of decades, and might have
even turned statistically insigniﬁcant more recently. To do so, we implement an
empirical framework that (i) incorporates both long-run equilibrium dynamics as
well as short-run transitional adjustments, and (ii) allows for inter-temporal co-
30eﬃcient variation: A time-varying coeﬃcients error-correction model (ECM). To
get a sense of what accounting for long lags does, we ﬁrst explore the relation-
ship between life expectancy and per capita income in a way analogous to Section
2 using a stylized ECM focusing only on (i). In a second step, we estimate a
fully-ﬂedged time-varying coeﬃcients ECM to investigate how the relationship
between the levels of life expectancy and per capita income has evolved over the
last four decades.
4.1 The Relationship Between Life Expectancy and per Capita
Income with Long Lags
Taking into account initial deviations from a long-run Preston curve and allowing
for long lags in the relationship between life expectancy and per capita income
might be key to explain the missing correlation in the changes regression of Equa-
tion (2), see Easterly (1999) and Pritchett and Viarengo (2010). For example, if
a country given its per capita income level in 1970 had a level of life expectancy
lower than that predicted by the Preston curve, and if the country’s level of life
expectancy converges to the predicted level of life expectancy only slowly over
time, then we should observe the country’s level of life expectancy to increase
over time by a larger number of years than would be predicted by the change in
per capita income. The noise stemming from neglecting initial conditions could
be a reason for the lack of a signiﬁcant correlation in Equation (2).
A stylized model linking life expectancy and per capita income with a long lag
31span, such as
llifei,2010 = τ+κ·llifei,1970+γ0·lgdpi,2010+γ1·lgdpi1970+νi,2010, (5)







where ϕ = κ−1, a = −τ/ϕ, b = −(γ0+γ1)/ϕ, and ∆xi.2010 = xi,2010−xi,1970. In this
error-correction framework, the transitional dynamics and the long-run equilib-
rium level relationship between life expectancy and per capita income are mod-
elled simultaneously. As long as ϕ < 0, Equation (6) implies that changes in life
expectancy do not only respond to current changes in per capita income, but also
to deviations of a country’s initial value of life expectancy from the value pre-
dicted by the long-run Preston curve.
The upper panel of Figure 13 displays for the full sample the ﬁtted values for the
long-run Preston curve upon estimation of Equation (6) and controlling for transi-
tional dynamics. The bottom panels display the results for the low- and the high-
HDI countries.11 Figure 14 displays the relationship between the change in the
logarithm of life expectancy and the change in the logarithm of per capita income
11The country samples are plotted in diﬀerent panels because the scatter plots are conditional
scatter plots and for each country sample the conditioning set is diﬀerent.
32controlling for initial deviations from a long-run Preston curve. Table 3 provides
a summary of the results, also featuring the implied half lives of deviations from
the long-run Preston curve.
Figure 13: The Relationship Between per Capita Income and Life Expectancy
with Long Lags



































































































































































Estimated b: 0.051 (0.00), R
2=0.59


































































Estimated b: −0.044 (0.64), R
2=0.22































































































































Estimated b: 0.054 (0.00), R
2=0.84
33Figure14: TheRelationshipBetween theChanges intheLogarithmsofper Capita
Income and Life Expectancy with Long Lags











































































































































































Estimated γ: 0.056 (0.00), R
2=0.59














































































Estimated γ: 0.022 (0.43), R
2=0.22





































































































































Estimated γ: 0.048 (0.00), R
2=0.84
34Table 3: Estimation Results for the Error Correction Model
Preston Curve





























Note: The table displays results from estimation of Equation (5), that is
∆llifei,2010 = ϕ·[llifei,1970 −a−b·lgdpi,1970]+γ0·∆lgdpi,2010 +νi,2010.
The results for the levels relationship between life expectancy and per capita in-
come broadly conﬁrm the results from Section 2. The income elasticity of life
expectancy is statistically insigniﬁcant for the low-HDI countries. Somewhat sur-
prisingly,thelong-run incomeelasticityisslightlylarger forthehigh-HDIcountry
sample than for the full sample. While the association between the change in the
logarithm of life expectancy and the change in the logarithm of per capita income
is (in contrast to the regression results for Equation (2)) signiﬁcant for the full
sample (which conﬁrms the importance of taking into account initial deviations
from the Preston curve when investigating the changes regression), once the sam-
ple is split it remains so only for the high-HDI countries.
Regarding the half lives, it is interesting to note that if a policymaker decided to
foster life expectancy through economic growth, the eﬀects on life expectancy
would materialize only rather slowly, especially for the low-HDI countries: it
would take around 32.8years to remove half of the distance to the long-run value
35of life expectancy implied by a higher value of per capita income. Put diﬀerently,
for a country with average life expectancy of 55 years (for example Botswana in
2010), according to the estimated Preston curve elasticity and half lives, a pol-
icy that leads to an increase in per capita income by 50% over 40 years (which
corresponds to around 100 additional basis points of growth per year) implies an
increase in life expectancy by 1.4years in the long-run, but only by 0.6years after
25 and 0.9years after 50 years.
As taking into account long lags might be key to appropriately describe certain
aspects of the relationship between life expectancy and per capita income (at least
for the countries close to the health technology frontier), we re-run the simu-
lations from Section 3.1 with a DGP that features an error-correction Preston
curve/independent shocks mixing. Figure 15 displays the results from the Pre-
ston curve/independent shocks mixing DGP described in Section 3.1.4, an error-
correction Preston curve DGP based on the error-correction model estimated in
this Section, and an error-correction Preston curve/independent shocks mixing
DGP. The simulated distribution of life expectancy is displayed in Figure 16.
36Figure 15: Monte Carlo Results for the Error-Correction DGP









Log Changes Regression: Point Estimates
Preston/IndepShocks Mixing DGP, p−Value:0.333
Error−Correction DGP, p−Value:0.268
ECR/IndepShocks Mixing DGP, p−Value:0.612









Log Changes Regression: t−Values
Preston/IndepShocks Mixing DGP, p−Value:0.251
Error−Correction DGP, p−Value:0.244
ECR/IndepShocks Mixing DGP, p−Value:0.362











Preston Curve: Point Estimates
Preston/IndepShocks Mixing DGP, p−Value:0.705
Error−Correction DGP, p−Value:0.701
ECR/IndepShocks Mixing DGP, p−Value:0.475










Preston/IndepShocks Mixing DGP, p−Value:0.77
Error−Correction DGP, p−Value:0.612
ECR/IndepShocks Mixing DGP, p−Value:0.792
37Figure 16: Cross-Sectional Distribution of Life Expectancy in 2010 for the Error-
Correction DGP






























While an error-correction DGP with a stable Preston curve appears to be likely
to replicate the actual estimates from the Preston curve in Equation (1) and also
the changes regression in Equation (2), it is unable to replicate the cross-sectional
distribution of life expectancy. To produce this feature of the data, also the error-
correction Preston curve DGP requires a mixing with independent shocks for low-
HDI countries.12 See also the p-values in Table 6.
12Further obvious statistics we could compute on the simulated data are the long-run Preston
curve and the changes coeﬃcient from the error-correction model. It turns out that the Preston
curve/independentshocksmixingDGP,thedoublePrestoncurveDGP,theerror-correctionPreston
curve/independent shocks mixing DGP, and the error-correction Preston curve DGP are able to
replicate this statistics reasonably well.
384.2 The Evolution of the Preston Curve Elasticity Over Time
While the foregoing Section focuses on properly accounting for short-run transi-
tional dynamics between life expectancy and per capita income, in this Section we
look more closely at the corresponding long-run equilibrium relationship. To this
end, we set up a truly annual ECM analogous to that in Equation (6), and allow
the parameters in the level relationship between life expectancy and per capita








with t = t0,t1,...,2010, t0 = 1970+max(p,q), or, written as an ECM,
∆llifeit = τt +ϕt·llifei,t−1+




































s=j+1γjt. The time-varying coeﬃcients could be estimated in a state-
space model framework, in which Equation (9) represents the measurement equa-
39tion. For each drifting coeﬃcient one would specify a state equation, in which the
coeﬃcient would typically evolve according to a unit root process. A computa-
tionally less burdensome approach is to approximate the evolution of the drifting





We let cj(t) be Chebyshev polynomials, choose p = q = 10, approximate the long-
run Preston curve parameters at and bt by second-order polynomials in time, and
the remaining short-run dynamics by ﬁrst-order polynomials in time.13 The es-
timation results for the long-run Preston curve parameters are reported in Figure
17.14 The ﬁrst row displays results for the full sample, and the second as well as
the last for the high- and the low-HDI countries only.
13In fact, we estimate Equation (8) instead of (9), and we approximate ϕt as well as
Pq
j=1δjt
by ﬁrst- and third-order polynomials. We then divide the polynomial for
Pq
j=1δjt by that for ϕt to
obtain the coeﬃcients of interest at and bt from Equation(9). As a result, the resulting polynomial
for bt does not necessarily look like a quadraticpolynomialwhen plottingit. The results are robust
to alternative choices of the lag and polynomial orders.
14We only plot the estimated functionals from 1980, as with a lag order of ten there do not
remain any observations for the time period from 1970 to 1979.
































































Low−HDI Countries: Log GDP
Inthefullsample,thePrestoncurveelasticityestimatesdecreaseovertime,arenot
statistically signiﬁcant at the beginning of the sample period and turn statistically
insigniﬁcant again from the mid 1990s. When splitting the sample, the long-run
Preston curve elasticity estimates remain statistically signiﬁcant for the high-HDI
41countries only, but even for the high-HDI countries decrease over time and turn
statistically insigniﬁcant from the end of the 1990s. For the low-HDI countries,
the Preston curve income elasticity is not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero over the entire sample period. As in Section 4.1, the point estimates of the
slope of the long-run Preston curve are slightly larger for the high-HDI coun-
tries than for the full sample; notice, however, the non-trivial extent of estimation
uncertainty in Figure 17. At the minimum, the time-varying coeﬃcients ECM
suggests a substantial decline in the long-run income elasticity of life expectancy
both in the full and the high-HDI country sample. Beyond that, there appears to
be a high probability for the income elasticity in the Preston curve having turned
statistically insigniﬁcant more recently even for the countries close to the health
technology frontier.15
Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between life expectancy and per
capita income. We claim that the income elasticity in the standard Preston curve is
likely to be overestimated due to the failure of controlling for countries’ distance
to the health technology frontier, and that the income elasticity of life expectancy
has substantiallydeclined even in countries close to the health technologyfrontier.
Our results are based on simple sample splits and basic econometric techniques
15Similarﬁndingsareobtainedwhenlookingat thestatic Prestoncurveestimates fromEquation
(1) over time.
42on the one hand, and a slightly more elaborate simulation exercise in which we
assess the ability of diﬀerent DGPs, each representing a competing theory about
the importance of per capita income for the determination of life expectancy, to
produce the patterns found in the actual data on the other hand.
We ﬁnd that for countries far away from the health technology frontier, even
though we cannot conclude with certainty, the eﬀects of income growth on life
expectancy are, relative to those of health technology adoption, close to zero. Our
results thus suggest that, whether or not income can be ruled out as a determi-
nant of life expectancy in countries far away from the health technology frontier,
policymakers in developing countries should be concerned about the factors un-
derlying their countries’ delayed convergence to the health technology frontier
rather than about how to most eﬀectively spur income growth. A casual look at
Figure 1 suggests that for a country far away from the health technology fron-
tier, adopting the health technologies already in place in the countries closer to
the frontier would result in an improvement of life expectancy of at least 14%.
In order to achieve the same improvement in life expectancy via growth in per
capita income (assuming for the moment the income elasticity estimate was sta-
tistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero), per capita income would have to grow
by about 3200%!16 Considering that technology adoption to a large extent con-
sists of introducing relatively inexpensive vector control measures, disseminating
16For large gx the approximation gx = (x1 − x0)/x0 ≈ log(x1)−log(x0) is misleading. With an
estimated income elasticity of 0.04the log diﬀerence in per capita income a countryfar away from
the technological frontier has to trace out in order to achieve an increase in life expectancyof 14%
is 3.5. Thus, the growth in per capita income associated with an improvement in life expectancy




−1 = exp(3.5)−1≈ 32.
43basic information on healthy behavior (avoiding indoor burning of solid fuels,
hand washing, promoting safer sex, breastfeeding, etc.), providing sugar-salt re-
hydrating therapies, antibiotics, vaccinations and so on, puts into stark contrast
what policymakers in developing countries can expect from policies focusing on
health technology adoption vis-à-vis income-growth centered policies. For exam-
ple, a package of six vaccines assembled by the World Health Organization costs
less than $1, and deworming costs just 50 cents a year.17 Enhanced accountability
of local governments, a free press, empowerment and education of their people
are certainly key to creating an environment conducive to the adoption of health
technologies. Globalization, by facilitating the spread of technologies, ideas and
behaviors, may signiﬁcantly speed up this process. By supporting the ﬂow of
health technologies from developed to developing countries, international orga-
nizations such as the World Health Organization or the United Nations may also
play a crucial role.
Finally, we provide evidence suggesting that even for the countries close to the
health technology frontier the role of income for the determination of life ex-
pectancy has substantially weakened during the last two to three decades. Health
conditions are thus becoming increasingly disconnected to per capita income in
developed countries. Living a healthier life requires new insights about healthy
behavior (smoking, obesity, stress, diet), their spread and adoption on a large
scale. The individual’s behavior thus appears to gain importance for the prolon-
gation of life in developed countries, too.
17See Miguel and Kremer (2004).
44A Appendix
A.1 Countries Included and Subsamples
The countries included in our baseline speciﬁcation with HDRO data are:
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria,
Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia,
Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Canada, Cape Verde, Chad,
Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Congo (Democratic Republic of the),
Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Denmark, Djibouti,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Fin-
land, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, China (SAR), Hungary,
Iceland, India, Indonesia,Ireland, Italy, Jamaica,Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya,
Korea (Republic of), Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia,
Liberia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta,
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Moldova (Re-
public of), Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua,
Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Sao Tome
and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Is-
lands, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Re-
public, Tajikistan, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo,
45Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United
Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic
of), Viet Nam .
The high-HDI countries are:
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Barbados,
Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile,
China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Do-
minican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France,
Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Hong Kong, China
(SAR), Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan,
Kazakhstan, Korea (Republic of), Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of),
Moldova(Republicof), Mongolia,Morocco, Netherlands,NewZealand, Nicaragua,
Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rus-
sian Federation, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swe-
den, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, The former Yu-
goslav Republic of Macedonia, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey,
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan,
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam .
The low-HDI countries are:
Afghanistan,Angola,Bangladesh, Benin, BurkinaFaso, Burundi,Cambodia, Chad,
Comoros, Congo, Congo (Democratic Republic of the), Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti,
46Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kenya, Lao People’s
DemocraticRepublic, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali,Mauritania, Nepal, Niger, Nige-
ria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Sudan, Togo .
A.2 Figures
Figure 18: The Cross-Sectional Distribution of Life Expectancy When Control-
ling for the Sub-Saharan African Average Level of Life Expectancy















Table 4: Death and Poverty Around the World in 2002
Millions of Deaths per Year Treatments, Prevention World Low-Income High-Income
Respiratory Infections Antibiotics 3.96 2.90 0.34
HIV/AIDS HAART 2.78 2.14 0.02
Perinatal Deaths Pre- and post-natal care 2.46 1.83 0.03
Diarrheal Diseases Oral rehydration therapy 1.80 1.50 0.00
Tuberculosis Public health: DOTS 1.57 1.09 0.01
Malaria Partially treatable 1.27 1.24 0.00
DPT/Measles/Polio Vaccinations 1.12 1.07 0.00
Percent of Deaths
Ages 0 to 4 18.4 30.2 0.9
Ages 60 and Above 50.8 34.2 75.9
Note: HAART stands for Highly-active anti-retroviral therapy, perinatal deaths are deaths in the ﬁrst seven days of life, and are typically associated with low birthweight,
DOTS stands for directly-observed treatment short course, and is treatment combined with community monitoring to ensure full compliance, and DPT stands for diphtheria,
pertussis (whooping cough) and tetanus. Low income and high income are World Bank designations and correspond (approximately) to below $5,000 and above $10,000
PPP in Figure 1. Note that the middle-income countries are not shown, so that the world ﬁgures are not the sum of the low-income and high-income ﬁgures. Figures are for
2002, are based on WHO data, and are subject to substantial margins of error. Table and note reproduced from Deaton (2007).
48Table 5: p-Values







b γ ∈ [b γ(j,r)±2·stdb γ(j,r)]
￿
Data -0.022 -1.45 0.095 0.68






























9Table 6: p-Values for the Double Preston Curve and the Error-Correction Model







b γ ∈ [b γ(j,r)±2·stdb γ(j,r)]
￿
Data -0.022 -1.45 0.095 0.68
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